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This paper assesses the plausibility of popular models of the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism for the G7 countries. For this purpose, ﬂexible structural vector
autoregressions are used to relaxe the restrictions behind the traditional identify-
ing schemes of monetary-policy shocks and their eﬀects on macroececonomic vari-
ables, and in particular, on real wages. The estimates reveal that expansionary
monetary-policy shocks produce declines of real wages for Canada, France, and
the United Kingdom. This is consistent with sticky-wage models and suggests
that labor-market frictions constitute prime features of these economies. In con-
strast, positive monetary-policy shocks yield increases of real wages for Germany,
Italy, Japan, and the United States. This is consistent with sticky-price models
and limited-participation models, so that goods-market frictions and/or ﬁnancial-
market frictions seem important characteristics of these economies. Finally, the
standard identifying restrictions are often statistically rejected and produce severe
distortions of real-wage responses.
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Monetary policies are at the center of several ongoing economic debates, such
as selections of exchange rate regimes, determinations of monetary zones, and con-
trols of inﬂation costs. In this context, it is important to understand the eﬀects
of monetary policies on key macroeconomic variables. This has motivated the de-
velopment of several models of the monetary transmission mechanism. Recently,
substantial attention has been devoted to sticky-wage models, sticky-price models,
and limited-participation models. Sticky-wage models incorporate frictions on the
labor market by stipulating that ﬁrms do not adjust intantaneously nominal wages
(e.g. Ascari 2000; B´ enassy 1995; Bordo, Erceg, and Evans 2000). Sticky-price mod-
els include frictions on the goods market by postulating that ﬁrms do not adjust
immediately prices (e.g. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan 2000; Rotemberg 1996; Yun
1996). Limited-participation models involve frictions on the ﬁnancial market by
assuming that households do not adjust instantaneously their portfolio choices (e.g.
Christiano and Eichenbaum 1995; Fuerst 1992; Lucas 1990).
Designing models which incorporate the various classes of frictions just de-
scribed proves useful to explain a substantial portion of the cyclical ﬂuctuations
of the U.S. economy (e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 2005). Yet, con-
fronting models which isolate the diﬀerent types of frictions proves useful to gauge
the relative importance of the labor-market frictions, goods-market frictions, and
ﬁnancial-market frictions (e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 1997). Such ex-
ercise reveals the prime features of the structure of the economy of a country. This
information is important to elaborate several global and country-speciﬁc macroeco-
nomic policies, and in particular, monetary policies.
1It is attractive to assess the relative importance of the various frictions from
the empirical dynamic eﬀects of expansionary monetary-policy shocks, given that
the alternative models lead to diﬀerent predictions following such policies. Namely,
the decrease of interest rate and increases of output and prices are predicted to be of
diﬀerent magnitudes and persistences across models. For example, prices increase
instantaneously in sticky-wage models and limited-participation models, whereas
they increase fairly slowly in sticky-price models. Unfortunately, it becomes most
challenging to use these price responses to detect the prime frictions, since no clean-
cut criterion exists to evaluate the adjustment rapidity of a variable. However, the
inertia in nominal wages implies that real wages decline in sticky-wage models, while
they increase in sticky-price models and limited-participation models. Thus, it is
possible to use these real-wage responses to determine, at least, the importance
of labor-market frictions relative to goods-market frictions and ﬁnancial-market
frictions, based on the strict creterion of the sign of real wage responses.
In this spirit, structural vector autoregressions (SVAR) are speciﬁed to iden-
tify monetary-policy shocks and measure their eﬀects on macroececonomic variables,
and in particular, on real wages. Empirically, some SVAR analyses indirectly con-
clude, from the relative magnitudes of nominal-wage responses and price responses,
that expansionary monetary-policy shocks lead to temporary declines of real wages
for synthetic euro-area data, but to transient increases of real wages for Germany
and the United States (Peersman and Smets 2001; Sims 1980; Sims and Zha 1998).
Other SVAR analyses directly show that real-wage responses are positive for the
United States (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 1997). This latter result is ro-
bust to economy-wide and sector-speciﬁc measures of real wages and to standard
identiﬁcation schemes of monetary-policy shocks.
2Typically, the identiﬁcation schemes impose various targeting and orthogo-
nality restrictions. The targeting restrictions deﬁne the monetary authority’s policy
indicator. The orthogonality restrictions may state that the monetary authority’s
exogenous policy actions have no impact eﬀects on certain macroeconomic variables
such as output, prices, and real wages. Alternatively, the orthogonality restrictions
may assume the inexistence of monetary authority’s endogenous policy adjustments
to changes in macroeconomic variables. These restrictions usually lead to exact
identiﬁcation, and thus, are unfortunately untestable.
This paper attempts to improve on earlier work by relaxing and testing the
standard identifying restrictions. This exercise relies on a ﬂexible SVAR that dis-
plays three important features (Normandin and Phaneuf 2004). First, it relaxes the
traditional assumption that structural innovations are conditionally homoscedastic.
Importantly, time-varying conditional volatilities may lead to over identiﬁcation, so
that the typical restrictions become testable (Sentana and Fiorentini 2001). Sec-
ond, our SVAR incorporates a simple formulation of the monetary market, which
nests two popular monetary-policy indicators. Thus, the validity of the restrictions
associated with interest-rate targeting (e.g. Bernanke and Blinder 1992; Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 1997; Sims 1992) and monetary-aggregate targeting
(e.g. Christiano and Eichenbaum 1992; Eichenbaum 1992; Sims 1980) can be ver-
iﬁed. Third, our SVAR admits current interactions between the monetary-policy
variables and the other macroeconomic variables. Hence, the validity of the or-
thogonality restrictions related to the absence of impact eﬀects of exogenous policy
actions (e.g. Christiano and Eichenbaum 1992; Eichenbaum 1992) and the inexis-
tence of endogenous policy adjustments (e.g. Sims 1980, 1992) can be checked.
The estimation of the ﬂexible SVAR is performed for each of the G7 countries
3using monthly data for the post-1983 period. The estimates are used to recover the
structural innovations, and in particular, the measures of policy shocks in order to
document the monetary authorities’ exogenous actions. Importantly, at least all,
but one, structural innovations display time-varying conditional variances for all
countries. Also, the policy-shock measures exhibit conditional volatilities which are
constant for Canada and the United Kingdom, moderately persistent for Germany,
Italy, and Japan, and very persistent for France and the United States. Moreover,
the policy-shock measures are consistent with exogenous domestic policy actions
(rather than endogenous adjustments to foreign-country phenomena), since they
are not statistically correlated for all pairs of countries. Finally, the policy-shock
measures are always consistent with the common observation of monetary analysts
that policy actions tend to be tight in expansionary phases and loose during con-
tractionary periods.
The estimates of the ﬂexible SVAR are further used to compute the dynamic
responses in order to assess the eﬀects of unanticipated expansionary monetary poli-
cies on marcroeconomic variables. Empirically, such shocks lead to the decrease of
interest rate and increases of monetary aggregate, output, and prices. This accords
with sticky-wage models, sticky-price models, and limited-participation models.
Also, positive monetary-policy shocks produce declines of real wages for Canada,
France, and the United Kingdom. This is consistent with sticky-wage models and
suggests that labor-market frictions constitute prime features of these economies.
In constrast, positive monetary-policy shocks yield increases of real wages for Ger-
many, Italy, Japan, and the United States. This is consistent with sticky-price
models and limited-participation models, so that goods-market frictions and/or
ﬁnancial-market frictions seem important characteristics of these economies.
4The various identifying schemes associated with standard targeting and or-
thogonality restrictions are next tested. Empirically, the restriction behind
monetary-aggregate targeting cannot be statistically rejected for all countries, ex-
cept France. In contrast, the restriction related to interest-rate targeting is refuted
for all countries, but France. Also, the orthogonality restrictions imposing that the
monetary authority’s exogenous policy actions have no impact eﬀects on macroe-
conomic variables are rejected for all countries, except the United States. Finally,
the alternative orthogonality restrictions stipulating the inexistence of monetary
authority’s endogenous policy adjustments are refuted for all countries, but France
and the United States.
For completeness, the economic consequences of imposing statistically in-
valid restrictions are veriﬁed. Such restrictions often produce severe distortions
of the policy-shock measures: they display incorrect signs, and thus, lead to er-
roneous indications about the direction of the exogenous policy actions for most
countries. Moreover, the invalid restrictions frequently yield pronounced distor-
tions of the real-wage responses: they display incorrect signs, and thus, lead to
erroneous selections about models of the monetary transmission mechanism for
many countries. For example, imposing false restrictions often incorrectly suggests
the relevance of sticky-price models or limited-participation models for Canada,
France, and the United Kingdom, and sticky-wage models for Germany and Japan.
However, placing invalid restrictions does not alter the conclusions regarding the
monetary transmission mechanism for Italy and the United States.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our ﬂexible SVAR
speciﬁcation. Section 3 outlines the estimation strategy and the underlying identiﬁ-
cation conditions. Section 4 estimates the SVAR parameters and tests the standard
5targeting and orthogonality restrictions. Sections 5 and 6 analyze the consequences
of the various restrictions for monetary-policy measures and their dynamic eﬀects.
Section 7 concludes.
2. Speciﬁcation
Throughout our analysis, a ﬂexible SVAR system is used for each country
to identify monetary-policy shocks and estimate their eﬀects on macroeconomic
variables. The system expresses the contemporaneous interactions between the
variables, in innovation form, as follows:
Aνt = ￿t. (1)
The vector νt contains the statistical innovations extracted from the observed
macroeconomic variables. The vector ￿t includes the unobserved structural inno-
vations. The matrix A measures the interactions between current statistical inno-
vations. The matrix B = A−1 measures the impact responses of the variables to
the structural innovations. The dynamic responses of the variables are obtained by
substituting the impact responses into the VAR.
A distinction is established between variables which are outside the monetary
market or non-monetary variables, and variables that belong to the monetary mar-
ket or monetary variables. The non-monetary variables are output, yt, aggregate
prices, pt, commodity prices, ct, and real wages, wt. The monetary variables are
the monetary aggregate, mt, and short-term interest rate, rt. Except for real wages,
this set of variables is often used in multi-country studies based on SVAR systems
(e.g. Kim 1999; Sims 1992). To achieve our goal, real wages are also included to
6assess their responses following monetary-policy shocks.
The monetary market is further developed by considering the simple formu-
lation:
νms,t = φσd￿d,t + σs￿s,t, (2.1)
νmd,t = −ανr,t + σd￿d,t. (2.2)
The terms νms,t and νmd,t denote the statistical innovations of the money sup-
ply and money demand. The structural innovations ￿s,t and ￿d,t correspond to
monetary-policy shocks and money-demand shocks. The parameters σs and σd are
the standard deviations scaling the structural innovations of interest, the coeﬃcient
α is constrained to be positive, and the parameter φ is unrestricted. Equation (2.1)
describes the procedures which may be used by the monetary authority to select its
policy instruments. Equation (2.2) represents the demand for money, in innovation
form.
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For conciseness, Ann =[ aij] (where i =1 ,...,4 and j =1 ,...,4) deﬁnes the
unconstrained parameters associated with the block of non-monetary variables.
7Amm =[ aij] (where i =5 ,6 and j =5 ,6) corresponds to the constrained, but non-
zero, coeﬃcients related to the block of monetary variables. Anm =[ aij] (where
i =1 ,...,4 and j =5 ,6) and Amn =[ aij] (where i =5 ,6 and j =1 ,...,4)
represent the unconstrained parameters across the blocks of variables. Thus, the
system (3) allows for interactions between the terms within and across the blocks of
non-monetary and monetary variables. As a result, all non-monetary and monetary
variables may contemporaneously be aﬀected by the structural innovations, and in
particular, by monetary-policy shocks.
To gain intuition, the ﬁfth equation of system (3) is rewritten as:
νs,t =
h
ρ51νy,t + ρ52νp,t + ρ53νc,t + ρ54νw,t
i
+ σs￿s,t. (4)
Equation (4) is interpreted as the monetary authority’s feedback rule. The term
νs,t =
￿
(1 − φ)νm,t − (αφ)νr,t
￿
corresponds to the statistical innovation of the
monetary-policy indicator. This indicator exclusively involves the monetary vari-
ables, since they convey information about the stance of monetary policy. In general,
the indicator reveals that the monetary authority adopts a mixed procedure where it
neither pursues pure interest-rate targeting (φ 6= 1) nor strict monetary-aggregate
targeting (φ 6= 0). The expression between brackets in (4) captures the system-
atic responses of the monetary authority to changes in non-monetary variables. In
general, these feedback eﬀects occur because the monetary authority designs its
policy by taking into account the current values of each non-monetary variables
(ρ5j = −a5jσs 6= 0 for j =1 ,...,4). Moreover, the term (σs￿s,t) represents scaled
monetary-policy shocks. These shocks capture exogenous policy actions taken by
the monetary authority.
8Also, the conditional-scedastic structure of system (3) is given by:
AΣtA0 =Γ t. (5)
Here, Σt = Et−1(νtν0
t) represents the conditional non-diagonal covariance matrix
of the non-orthogonal statistical innovations. Γt = Et−1(￿t￿0
t) is the conditional
diagonal covariance matrix of the orthogonal structural innovations. I = E(￿t￿0
t)
normalizes (without loss of generality) the unconditional variances of the structural
innovations to unity. The conventional studies impose Γt = I, so that the structural
innovations are conditionally homoscedastic. This implies Σt = BB0, such that the
conditional second moments of the statistical innovations are time-invariant. In
contrast, our analysis relies on Γt 6= I, which allows conditional heteroscedasticity
of the structural innovations. As a result, Σt 6= BB0, which permits time-varying
conditional second moments of the statistical innovations.
Finally, the dynamics of the conditional variances of the structural innova-
tions is speciﬁed as:
Γt =( I − ∆1 − ∆2)+∆ 1 • (￿t−1￿0
t−1)+∆ 2 • Γt−1. (6)
The operator • denotes the element-by-element matrix multiplication, while ∆1
and ∆2 are diagonal matrices of parameters. Equation (6) characterizes the con-
ditional variances of the structural innovations from univariate generalized autore-
gressive conditional heteroscedastic [GARCH(1,1)] processes, where ∆1 contains
the ARCH coeﬃcients and ∆2 incorporates the GARCH coeﬃcients. In general,
the GARCH(1,1) processes oﬀer the considerable advantages of being more parsi-
monious than alternative large-scale multivariate speciﬁcations (e.g. Diebold and
9Nerlove 1989; Normandin and St-Amour 1998) and of reproducing alternate periods
of volatility and smoothness which characterize several macroeconomic time-series
(e.g. Bollerslev, Chou, and Kroner 1992; Pagan and Robertson 1995). In our
case, positive deﬁnite ∆1,∆ 2, and (I − ∆1 − ∆2) imply that all structural innova-
tions display time-varying (positive and stationary) conditional variances. Positive
semi-deﬁnite ∆1 and ∆2, and positive deﬁnite (I −∆1 −∆2) signify that only some
structural innovations exhibit conditional heteroscedasticity. Zero ∆1 and ∆2 imply
that all structural innovations are conditionally homoscedastic. Also, the intercepts
(I − ∆1 − ∆2) are consistent with the normalization I = E(￿t￿0
t).
3. Estimation Strategy
The estimation of the speciﬁcation just presented is performed by resort-
ing to a two-step procedure which explicitly takes into account the conditional
heteroscedasticity and orthogonality of the structural innovations (Normandin and
Phaneuf 2004). The ﬁrst step consists in an equation-by-equation ordinary least
squares (OLS) estimation of the coeﬃcients of a τ-order VAR process. From this
exercise, the estimates of the statistical innovations νt and of their conditional co-
variances Σt are recovered for t =( τ +1 ) ,...,T. Speciﬁcally, the estimate of Σt is
computed by using equations (5) and (6) evaluated for system (3), by initializing
Γτ =( ￿τ￿0
τ)=I from the unconditional moments, and by giving values to the pa-
rameters Θ — where Θ is the vector composed of all the non-zero elements of A,
∆1, and ∆2.
The second step is a maximum-likelihood (ML) estimation of the parameters
included in Θ. The log-likelihood of the sample (ignoring the constant term) is















where νt and Σt are evaluated at their estimates. The log-likelihood (7) is then
maximized over the parameters Θ using the BHHH algorithm.
The importance of exploiting the conditional heteroscedasticity and orthog-




where A∗ = QA, ￿∗
t = Q￿t, and Q is an arbitrary orthogonal transformation matrix
(i.e. QQ0 = Q0Q = I). Clearly, system (3) is econometrically identiﬁed when A is
unique (up to column sign changes) under orthogonal transformations, so Q = I and
Q = I1/2 are the only admissible transformations preserving the orthogonality of the
rotated structural innovations in (8) (i.e. Γ∗
t = QΓtQ0 is diagonal). Moreover, ﬁxing
the sign of the diagonal elements of A ensures global identiﬁcation. This implies
that monetary-policy shocks are identiﬁed. This also means that B is uniquely
deﬁned and the eﬀects of monetary-policy shocks are identiﬁed. In practice, this
translates into a log-likelihood function (7) that is not ﬂat. That is, system (3)
yields similar estimates of the parameters under alternative starting values for Θ.
The suﬃcient (rank) condition for identiﬁcation states that the conditional
variances of the structural innovations are linearly independent. That is, λ =0
is the only solution to Γλ = 0, such that (Γ0Γ) is invertible — where Γ stacks
by column the conditional volatilities (for t =( τ +1 ) ,...,T) associated with each
11structural innovation. The necessary (order) condition requires that the conditional
variances of (at least) all, but one, structural innovations are time-varying. In
practice, the rank and order conditions lead to similar conclusions, given that the
conditional variances are parametrized by GARCH(1,1) processes (Sentana and
Fiorentini 2001).
Unlike our estimation procedure, the conventional studies based on SVAR
systems impose the conditional homoscedasticity of all structural innovations. In
this context, systems (3) and (8) are observationally equivalent up to second mo-
ments (i.e. Σ∗
t =Σ t = BB0) with orthogonally rotated structural innovations (i.e.
Γ∗
t = QΓtQ0 = I is diagonal) for any admissible transformation matrices Q.I t
follows that A and B are not unique, so monetary-policy shocks and their eﬀects
on macroeconomic variables are not identiﬁed. In practice, this translates into a
log-likelihood function (7) that is ﬂat.
In this context, a common strategy is to identify the monetary-policy shocks
without having to identify the entire system (3). To do so, it is suﬃcient, for
example, to impose two types of restrictions which ensure , ﬁrst, the identiﬁcation
of the monetary block Amm and, second, the zero conditions Anm = 0. In such a
case, Am =( A0
nm|A0
mm)0 =( 0 0|A0
mm)0 is uniquely determined (up to column sign
changes), so that Qnm = 0 and Qmm = I or Qmm = I1/2 are the only admissble
submatrices. Moreover, ﬁxing the sign of the diagonal elements of Amm guarantees





0)0 is also unique, so that the eﬀects of monetary-policy shocks are identiﬁed.
First, the exact identiﬁcation of Amm can be achieved by imposing a sin-
gle restriction, given that the monetary block involves four unknown parameters
12and three distinct time-invariant covariances. From an economic perspective, this
restriction deﬁnes the monetary-policy indicator as follows.
R Indicator: φ = 1. The monetary-policy indicator in the feedback rule (4) reduces
to νs,t = −ανr,t, so that the interest rate is the single policy variable (e.g. Bernanke
and Blinder 1992; Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 1997; Sims 1992). In this
context, changes in the interest rate entirely summarize the stance of the monetary
policy. This is because the monetary authority targets the interest rate by fully
oﬀseting money-demand shocks.
M Indicator: φ = 0. The monetary-policy indicator in (4) becomes νs,t = νm,t,
such that the monetary aggregate is the single policy variable (e.g. Christiano
and Eichenbaum 1992; Eichenbaum 1992; Sims 1980). Therefore, changes in the
monetary aggregate completely reveal the stance of the policy. This occurs because
the authority targets the monetary aggregate, and as such does not respond at all
to money-demand shocks.
Second, the economic interpretation of the zero conditions Anm = 0 is the
following.
No-Impact Eﬀects: Anm = 0. The monetary-policy shocks have no impact eﬀects
on the non-monetary variables (e.g. Christiano and Eichenbaum 1992; Eichenbaum
1992). This implies that monetary-policy shocks are orthogonal to the variables
involved in the systematic component of the feedback rule (4). In addition, the ab-
sence of impact eﬀects occurs because monetary-policy shocks have no direct eﬀects
and indirect eﬀects. The direct eﬀects correspond to the contemporaneous responses
of the non-monetary variables to the policy variable. Thus, these eﬀects are cap-
tured by the coeﬃcients ai5 and ai6 (where i =1 ,...,4) under the M Indicator and
13R Indicator, respectively. The indirect eﬀects correspond to the contemporaneous
eﬀects of the policy variable on the non-monetary variables through its current im-
pact on the non-policy monetary variable. Hence, these eﬀects are reﬂected by ai6
and ai5 (where i =1 ,...,4) under the M Indicator and R Indicator.
In practice, this identiﬁcation scheme is implemented by measuring
monetary-policy shocks from Choleski decompositions of the VAR-residual covari-
ance matrix, which imply that A is lower triangular with positive elements on the
diagonal. These decompositions are obtained by ordering the non-monetary vari-
ables ﬁrst, followed by the policy variable, and by the other monetary variable.
Note that the measure of monetary-policy shocks are not altered by the particular
ordering within the block of non-monetary variables, since the system is not entirely
identiﬁed. Also, the associated restrictions deﬁning the monetary-policy indicator
and ruling out the impact eﬀects are untestable, given that the system is not entirely
identiﬁed.
Alternatively, the identiﬁcation of monetary-policy shocks can be achieved
by imposing restrictions which ensure the identiﬁcation of the monetary block Amm
and the zero conditions Amn = 0, rather than Anm = 0. Some implications of the
alternative zero conditions are the following.
No-Feedback Eﬀects: a5j = 0 (where j =1 ,...,4). There is no systematic compo-
nent in the feedback rule (4) since ρ5j = 0 (e.g. Sims 1980, 1992). This implies
that the monetary authority does not adjust endogenously the policy to respond to
current non-monetary phenomena.
In practice, this alternative identiﬁcation scheme is implemented from
Choleski decompositions obtained by ordering the policy variable ﬁrst. Again, the
14particular ordering of the non-policy variables is irrelevant and the underlying re-
strictions are untestable.
4. Estimation Results
The estimation results are obtained from monthly data for the G7 countries.
The sample covers the 1983-01 to 1998-12 period for France, Germany, and Italy,
and the 1983-01 to 2001-10 period for Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. Germany refers to West Germany and Uniﬁed Germany for the
pre- and post-1990 periods. According to many observers, the post-1983 period
represents a fairly stable economic environment for many of the G7 countries. In
principle, this eases the identiﬁcation of monetary-policy shocks, since the associated
measures are less likely to be contaminated by major non-monetary phenomena (e.g.
oil shocks). Also, the pre-1999 period for France, Germany, and Italy focuses on
the episode before the European Monetary Union. As usual, the series are at the
monthly frequency. Compared to lower frequency data, these series are likely to
display greater conditional volatilities, which constitute a crucial feature for our
estimation strategy.
The variables involved in system (3) are mostly measured from the Interna-
tional Financial Statistics (IFS) released by the International Monetary Funds and
the Main Economic Indicators (MEI) published by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development. The non-monetary variables are computed as fol-
lows. As is standard practice, yt corresponds to the industrial-production indices
(source: IFS) and pt is the consumer-price indices (source: IFS) for all countries.
Also, ct is measured as the world-export commodity-price index in U.S. dollars
(source: IFS) for the United States. This index is further converted in national
15currencies by using the market exchange rate (source: IFS) for the other countries.
This variable captures inﬂationary pressures and foreign-economic changes reﬂected
in exchange-rate movements (Sims 1992; Kim 1999). Finally, wt is computed as the
nominal wages (source: MEI) normalized by pt. The nominal wages correspond
to the (hourly, weekly, or monthly) earning indices of the manufacturing sector for
Canada, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The nom-
inal wages are captured by the (hourly) wage rates of the industry sector for Italy
and of all activities for France. The nominal wages are interpolated from quarterly
to monthly frequencies (source: DISTRIB procedure in RATS) for France and Ger-
many. These measures of nominal wages are mainly dictated by the availability of
the data. An obvious exception is that both sector-speciﬁc and economy-wide mea-
sures of nominal wages are reported for the United States. Given that the various
measures of nominal wages for the United States yield similar eﬀects of monetary-
policy shocks (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 1997), our analysis relies on the
manufacturing-sector data to facilitate comparisons with most of the G7 countries.
The monetary variables are computed as follows. The variable rt is measured
by the overnight money-market rate (source: MEI) for Canada, the call-money rates
(source: IFS) for France, Germany and Japan, the mid-term government-bond yield
(source: IFS) for Italy, the minimum overnight interbank rate (source: IFS) for the
United Kingdom, and the Federal-funds rate (source: IFS) for the United States.
These measures are similar to the data often used in previous multi-country studies
(e.g. Kim 1999; Sims 1992). Also, mt corresponds to M1 (source: MEI) for France
and (source: IFS) for Canada, Germany, Italy, and Japan, but to Retail M4 (source:
Bank of England) for the United Kingdom and M2 (source: Federal Reserve Bank
of St-Louis macro database - Fred) for the United States. M1 is selected for most
16countries since it is frequently used in earlier multi-country analyses (e.g. Sims
1980, 1992). Retail M4 for the United Kingdom is dictated by the availability of
the data and is close to the deﬁnition of M2. Finally, M2 is selected for the United
States to conform with previous SVAR analyses evaluating the eﬀects of monetary-
policy shocks on real wages for this country (e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans 1997; Sims and Zha 1998).
The non-monetary and monetary variables are all expressed in logarithms,
except the short-term interest rates. The variables are further measured from
seasonally-adjusted data, whenever possible. For each country, these variables are
used to calculate the OLS estimates associated with a VAR process which includes
a complete set of seasonal dummies and six lags (τ = 6). For all cases, the Ljung-
Box and heteroscedastic-robust Lagrange-Multiplier (LM) test statistics are never
signiﬁcant (at the 5% level) for p-order autocorrelations and AR(p) processes of
the VAR residuals (with p =1 ,3, and 6). In contrast, the McLeod and LM test
statistics are sometimes signiﬁcant for p-order autocorrelations of the squared VAR
residuals and ARCH(p) eﬀects (with p =1 ,3, and 6). These ﬁndings suggest the
presence of conditional heteroscedasticity in some statistical innovations, which is
likely to translate into time-varying conditional variances of structural innovations
— given that Σt 6= BB0 if Γt 6= I.
For briefness, the ML estimates are only reported for the GARCH(1,1) co-
eﬃcients, the monetary-market parameters, as well as the impact and feedback
eﬀects. Table 1 presents the estimates of the GARCH(1,1) parameters. For each
country, the estimates imply that (I − ∆1 − ∆2) is positive deﬁnite, whereas ∆1
and ∆2 are positive semi-deﬁnite since all, but one, structural innovations display
time-varying conditional volatilities. This accords with the order condition for the
17identiﬁcation of system (3). Also, (Γ0Γ) has a large positive determinant and is in-
vertible. This is consistent with the rank condition. Overall, these ﬁndings conﬁrm
that monetary-policy shocks and their eﬀects are identiﬁed.
For all countries, the McLeod and LM test statistics are never signiﬁcant
for p-order autocorrelations of the squared structural innovations (relative to their
conditional variances) and GARCH(p,q) eﬀects (with p =1 ,3, and 6 and q = 1).
This suggests that the estimates of the GARCH(1,1) coeﬃcients provide an ade-
quate description of the conditional heteroscedasticity of all structural innovations,
and in particular, of monetary-policy shocks. In addition, monetary-policy shocks
exhibit conditional volatilities which are constant for Canada and the United King-
dom, moderately persistent for Germany, Italy, and Japan, and very persistent for
France and the United States — where the persistence is measured by the sum of
the ARCH and GARCH coeﬃcients.
Table 2 shows the estimates of the monetary-market parameters. For all
countries, the estimates exhibit the expected signs, although there are often impre-
cise. The estimates of σs and σd reveal that the sizes of monetary-policy shocks are
always numerically smaller than those of the money-demand shocks. The estimates
of α indicate that the slope of the money demand is systematically negative, and
is statistically signiﬁcant for Italy, Japan, and the United States. The estimates of
φ are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than zero for all countries, except France. Further-
more, the estimates of φ are statistically diﬀerent than one for all countries, but
France. Thus, these results support the restriction associated with the M Indicator
for Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States,
and the restriction behind the R Indicator for France.
18Table 3 displays the estimates of the impact eﬀects. The estimates of ai5
(for i =1 ,...,4) are jointly signiﬁcant for all countries, except France and the
United States. Also, the estimates of ai6 (for i =1 ,...,4) are jointly signiﬁcant
for Canada, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Given the deﬁnition of the
policy variable for each country, these results suggest that monetary-policy shocks
have direct eﬀects for Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United
Kingdom. Speciﬁcally, the estimates of the individual coeﬃcients indicate that these
direct eﬀects are signiﬁcant on aggregate prices for Canada, France, and Germany,
commodity prices for Italy, output for the United Kingdom, as well as output,
commodity prices, and real wages for Japan. In addition, monetary-policy shocks
have indirect eﬀects for Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom. The estimates
of the individual coeﬃcients reveal that these indirect eﬀects are signiﬁcant on
output for Canada, real wages for the United Kingdom, and output and commodity
prices for Japan. In sum, the results suggest that the restrictions related to the
No-Impact Eﬀects are rejected for Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the
United Kingdom, but not for the United States.
Table 4 reports the estimates of the feedback eﬀects. The estimates of a5j
(for j =1 ,...,4) are jointly signiﬁcant for all countries, except France and the
United States. In addition, the estimates of the individual coeﬃcients suggest that
the monetary authority adjusts endogenously the policy to current movements in
aggregate prices for Canada, commodity prices for Italy and Japan, as well as output
and real wages for the United Kingdom. Thus, the results reject the restrictions
associated with the No-Feedback Eﬀects for Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, and
the United Kingdom, but not for France and the United States.
Overall, the results suggest that monetary-policy shocks cannot be ade-
19quately recovered from Choleski decompositions for most countries. This occurs
because the zero conditions associated with both the No-Impact Eﬀects and No-
Feedback Eﬀects are rejected for Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United
Kingdom. In contrast, the ﬁndings indicate that Choleski decompositions obtained
by ordering the interest rate ﬁrst should be valid for France, given that the re-
strictions behind the R indicator and No-Feedback Eﬀects are not refuted. Finally,
Choleski decompositions obtained by ordering the monetary aggregate either ﬁrst or
after the non-monetary variables should be relevant for the United States, since the
restrictions related to the M indicator, No-Impact Eﬀects, and No-Feedback Eﬀects
are not rejected.
5. Monetary-Policy Measures
The unrestricted monetary-policy measures are extracted from the ﬂexible
conditional-heteroscedastic SVAR (3). This system captures the impact eﬀects
(Anm 6= 0) and feedback eﬀects (Amn 6= 0). Also, the associated feedback rule
(4) implies a policy indicator involving both the interest rate (φ 6= 0) and monetary
aggregate (φ 6= 1), a systematic component (ρ5j 6= 0 for j =1 ,...,4), and policy
shocks.
Empirically, the unrestricted measures of the systematic component are sig-
niﬁcantly correlated for almost all pairs of countries. This suggests that the sys-
tematic components reﬂect endogenous reactions to foreign variables, and perhaps,
to foreign monetary policies. In particular, the strong correlations between the sys-
tematic components for the various countries and for the United States may capture
the endogenous adjustments of these countries to the U.S. monetary policy. Like-
wise, the signiﬁcant correlations between the systematic components for France or
20Italy and for Germany may reﬂect the endogenous adjustments of the European
Monetary System members to the German monetary policy. Note that these strong
correlations occur even if the feedback rule (4) does not explicitly include foreign
monetary variables (e.g. Grilli and Roubini 1995; Kim and Roubini 2000). However,
the correlations arise because the U.S. and German monetary policies presumably
aﬀect the exchange rates (used to convert commodity prices in national currencies)
of most countries and potentially jointly alter domestic and foreign outputs, prices,
or real wages. Finally, the unrestricted measures of monetary-policy shocks are
not statistically correlated for all pairs of countries. This suggests that our iden-
tiﬁed monetary-policy shocks reﬂect the exogenous policy actions occuring in each
country.
Figure 1 plots the smoothed unrestricted measures of monetary-policy
shocks. For ease of interpretation, the measures smooth the noisy (serially uncorre-
lated) monetary-policy shocks from a ﬁve-month centered, equal-weighted moving
average. Also, negative (positive) values of the smoothed measures reﬂect contrac-
tionary (expansionary) monetary-policy shocks. Empirically, the unrestricted mea-
sures are generally consistent with common observations about changes in monetary
policy occuring through the business-cycle phases. That is, the monetary-policy ac-
tions tend to be tight in expansionary phases and loose in contractionary periods,
so that monetary-policy shocks typically display countercyclical movements. For
example, the monetary-policy actions are tight at the business-cycle peaks, loose
during the contractionary phases, and tight slightly before the troughs for Canada,
Japan, and the United Kingdom. Also, the monetary-policy actions are loose just
after the peaks and before the troughs for France, Germany, Italy, and the United
States.
21Figure 1 also confronts the smoothed unrestricted and restricted measures
of monetary-policy shocks. The restricted measures are extracted from conditional-
heteroscedastic systems which impose the restrictions associated with either the
M Indicator, R Indicator, No-Impact Eﬀects,o rNo-Feedback Eﬀects. Empirically,
the unrestricted and restricted measures are similar for most countries, as long as
the associated restrictions are statistically valid. In contrast, the unrestricted and
restricted measures substantially deviate for many cases, when the associated re-
strictions are signiﬁcantly rejected. The distortions are particularly severe under
the restrictions related to the M Indicator for France, the R Indicator for Canada,
Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the No-Impact Eﬀects
for Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom, as well as the No-Feedback Eﬀects
for Japan and the United Kingdom. For these cases, the restricted measures of
monetary-policy shocks frequently display incorrect magnitudes and signs, and as
such indicate incorrect amplitudes and directions of the policy actions. Overall,
these results suggest that imposing invalid restrictions can lead to important mis-
measurements of monetary-policy shocks.
6. Dynamic Responses
The unrestricted dynamic responses are computed from the ﬂexible
conditional-heteroscedastic SVAR (3), which captures the impact eﬀects (Anm 6=0 )
and feedback eﬀects (Amn 6= 0), as well as policy indicators involving both the in-
terest rate (φ 6= 0) and monetary aggregate (φ 6= 1). Figure 2 displays the dynamic
responses of the various variables following positive, one unconditional standard-
deviation, monetary-policy shocks. This ﬁgure also shows the (possibly asymetric)
68% probability intervals computed from a bayesian procedure (Sims and Zha 1999).
22For the monetary variables, the eﬀects of policy shocks are the following.
First, the monetary-aggregate responses are statistically signiﬁcant, highly persis-
tent, and positive for all countries. For example, these responses smoothly decline
over the horizons for Canada, Germany, and Italy, are fairly stable for Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the United States, and gradually increase for France.
Second, the interest-rate responses are always statistically negative at im-
pact. However, these responses display diﬀerent magnitudes and persistences across
countries. That is, they are pronounced for Canada, France, and the United King-
dom, compared to those for Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United States. This
occurs because the declines of interest rate are reversed less rapidly for the coun-
tries where the inﬂationary pressures from monetary expansions tend to be less
persistent, as will be discussed below. Importantly, such transient liquidity eﬀects
are predicted by most mainstream macroeconomic theories, including sticky-wage
models, sticky-price models, and limited-participation models. In addition, the sys-
tematic impact decreases of interest rate and increases of monetary aggregate lead
to contemporaneous increases of the monetary-policy indicators, which conﬁrm a
loose monetary policy stance.
For the non-monetary variables, the eﬀects of policy shocks are the following.
First, the output responses are always positive over some horizons and statistically
signiﬁcant for all countries, but Canada. In addition, these responses are hump-
shaped so that the increase in economic activity is followed by a return to the intitial
level for all countries, except the United Kingdom. These ﬁndings provide empirical
support for macroeconomic theories predicting the non-neutrality of money, such
as sticky-wage models, sticky-price models, and limited-participation models.
23Second, the price responses are positive for most horizons and are generally
statistically signiﬁcant. This accords with mainstream macroeconomic theories,
which predict that inﬂationary pressures are exerted by monetary expansions. Also,
prices increase drastically at impact and then decline smoothly for Canada and
France. This pattern seems consistent with sticky-wage and limited-participation
models, where price adjustments are instantaneous. Prices adjust fairly slowly by
increasing only after around six months for Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. This pattern seems to accord with sticky-price models,
which predict a signiﬁcant amount of inertia in aggregate-price behavior. Prices
exhibit almost no reaction at impact, but then increase relatively quickly for Italy.
This pattern is not entirely consistent with neither sticky-wage models, sticky-price
models, nor limited-participation models. It further illustrates that model selections
based on price behavior are challenging, since no formal criterion exists to determine
the rapidity of price adjustments.
Third, the commodity-price responses are positive over some horizons for
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, are fairly stable for the
United States, and are largely negative for Japan. In principal, these responses can
either be negative, null, or positive. This is explained, in part, by the behavior of
exchange rates (used to convert commodity prices in national currencies). That is,
the national currencies may appreciate or depreciate at impact depending on the
revisions of expected inﬂation following monetary expansions.
Fourth, the real-wage responses are transient for most countries, but are very
persistent for Japan and the United Kingdom. Moreover, the real-wage responses
are statistically negative for Canada, France, and the United Kingdom. This pattern
is consistent with a substantial degree of inertia in nominal wages as predicted
24by sticky-wage models, and suggests that labor-market frictions constitute prime
features of these economies. In contrast, the real-wage responses are signiﬁcantly
positive for Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United States. This pattern accords
with instantaneous adjustments of nominal wages as implied by sticky-price models
and limited-participation models, and suggests that goods-market frictions and/or
ﬁnancial-market frictions are important characteristics of these economies. Also,
these ﬁndings corroborate previous results documented for Germany and the United
States. Finally, recall that model selections based on real-wage behavior rely on a
strict creterion, namely the sign of the real-wage responses. In this sense, such
model selections are less controversial than those based on price behavior.
For completeness, the consequences of imposing the various restrictions on
the dynamic responses are evaluated. This exercise is performed exclusively for
the real-wage responses in order to invoke our strict creterion of model selections.
Figure 3 compares the unrestricted and restricted dynamic responses of real wages to
expansionary monetary-policy shocks. The restricted responses are obtained from
conditional-heteroscedastic systems which impose the restrictions associated with
either the M Indicator, R Indicator, No-Impact Eﬀects,o rNo-Feedback Eﬀects.
Empirically, the unrestricted and restricted responses are similar for most
countries, as long as the associated restrictions are statistically valid. Exception-
ally, substantial distortions are documented under the restrictions related to the
M Indicator for the United Kingdom and the No-Feedback Eﬀects for France. For
the United Kingdom, the distortions mainly aﬀect the magnitudes of the dynamic
responses, and as such do not alter the conclusions about model selections. For
France, the distortions aﬀect the signs of the responses, so that they falseley reverse
the conclusions. The distortions also indicate that the Choleski decompositions
25obtained by ordering the interest rate ﬁrst are numerically misleading for France,
even if the restrictions behind the R Indicator and No-Feedback Eﬀects are not
statistically rejected.
In contrast, the unrestricted and restricted responses substantially deviate
for many cases, when the associated restrictions are signiﬁcantly rejected. The
distortions are particularly severe under the restrictions related to the M Indicator
for France, the R Indicator for Canada, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and
the United States, the No-Impact Eﬀects for Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and
the United Kingdom, as well as the No-Feedback Eﬀects for Japan and the United
Kingdom. In addition, the restricted responses display the wrong signs under the
restrictions behind the R Indicator for Canada and Germany, the No-Impact Eﬀects
for France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom, and the No-Feedback Eﬀects
for Japan and the United Kingdom.
Overall, these results suggest that imposing invalid restrictions can lead to
erroneous conclusions about model selections of the monetary transmission mecha-
nism for many countries. In particular, imposing false restrictions often incorrectly
suggests the relevance of sticky-price models or limited-participation models for
Canada, France, and the United Kingdom, and sticky-wage models for Germany
and Japan. However, placing invalid restrictions does not alter the conclusions
regarding the monetary transmission mechanism for Italy and the United States.
These ﬁndings corroborate previous results obtained for the United States, namely
that the signs of real-wage responses are robust to alternative identiﬁcation schemes
of monetary-policy shocks.
267. Conclusion
This paper has attempted to improve on earlier work by using a ﬂexible
SVAR, which relaxes the restrictions behind the traditional identifying schemes
of monetary-policy shocks and their eﬀects on macroececonomic variables, and in
particular, on real wages. Empirically, expansionary monetary-policy shocks pro-
duce declines of real wages for Canada, France, and the United Kingdom. This is
consistent with sticky-wage models and suggests that labor-market frictions con-
stitute prime features of these economies. In constrast, positive monetary-policy
shocks yield increases of real wages for Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United
States. This is consistent with sticky-price models and limited-participation mod-
els, so that goods-market frictions and/or ﬁnancial-market frictions seem important
characteristics of these economies.
Also, the standard identifying restrictions are often statistically rejected.
Imposing such invalid restrictions has important economic consequences. First, it
produces severe distortions of the policy-shock measures: they display incorrect
signs, and thus, lead to erroneous indications about the direction of the exogenous
policy actions for most countries. Second, it yields pronounced distortions of the
real-wage responses: they display incorrect signs, and thus, lead to erroneous selec-
tions about models of the monetary transmission mechanism for many countries.
Future research could apply ﬂexible SVAR to analyze the eﬀects of monetary-
policy shocks on proﬁts. This analysis would be useful given that sticky-price mod-
els predict declines of proﬁts, whereas limited-participation models imply increases
of proﬁts following expansionary monetary-policy shocks (e.g. Christiano, Eichen-
baum, and Evans 1997). Such analysis would thus allows the evaluation of the
27relative importance of the goods-market frictions and ﬁnancial-market frictions for
each country.
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30Table 1. Estimates of the GARCH(1,1) Parameters
Countries ￿1t ￿2t ￿3t ￿4t ￿st ￿dt
Canada 0.451 — 0.537 — 0.157 — 0.109 0.852 — — 0.238 —
(0.169) (0.183) (0.104) (0.055) (0.073) (0.117)
France 0.104 0.802 0.516 — — — 0.160 0.562 0.743 — 0.222 —
(0.082) (0.155) (0.192) (0.129) (0.369) (0.254) (0.175)
Germany — — 0.120 0.838 0.315 — 0.127 0.749 0.127 — 0.256 —
(0.069) (0.081) (0.211) (0.087) (0.180) (0.132) (0.150)
Italy 0.105 — 0.289 — 0.270 — — — 0.362 — 0.400 —
(0.117) (0.199) (0.175) (0.187) (0.183)
Japan — — 0.516 — 0.074 0.922 0.174 — 0.118 — 0.615 —
(0.158) (0.043) (0.059) (0.115) (0.126) (0.211)
United Kingdom 0.205 — 0.223 — 0.268 — 0.230 — — — 0.092 0.846
(0.124) (0.117) (0.124) (0.173) (0.061) (0.099)
United States — — 0.142 0.746 0.284 — 0.381 — 0.126 0.849 0.080 0.915
(0.064) (0.126) (0.105) (0.153) (0.074) (0.084) (0.031) (0.033)
Note: Entries are the estimates (standard errors) of the parameters of the GARCH(1,1) processes (6). For each structural
innovation, the ﬁrst and second columns refer to the ARCH and GARCH coeﬃcients, respectively. — indicates that zero-
restrictions are imposed to ensure that ∆1 and ∆2 are non-negative deﬁnite.
31Table 2. Estimates of the Monetary-Market Parameters
Countries σs σd αφ φ =0 φ =1
Canada 0.014 0.044 0.066 0.027 [0.821] [0.000]
(0.118) (0.032) (0.050) (0.117)
France 0.003 0.011 0.005 0.955 [0.000] [0.395]
(0.057) (0.002) (0.004) (0.053)
Germany 0.021 0.522 1.281 0.002 [0.980] [0.000]
(0.144) (1.869) (4.402) (0.010)
Italy 0.013 0.049 0.137 0.070 [0.348] [0.000]
(0.115) (0.026) (0.066) (0.075)
Japan 0.069 0.119 0.525 0.035 [0.757] [0.000]
(0.263) (0.063) (0.236) (0.111)
United Kingdom 0.006 0.016 0.017 0.295 [0.315] [0.016]
(0.079) (0.013) (0.016) (0.293)
United States 0.002 0.019 0.069 0.009 [0.651] [0.000]
(0.049) (0.013) (0.043) (0.021)
Note: Entries are the estimates (standard errors) of the parameters of the monetary-market speciﬁcation (2). Numbers in brackets
are the p-values associated with the χ2(1) test statistics that φ = 0 and φ =1 .
32Table 3. Estimates of the Impact Eﬀects
Countries a15 a25 a35 a45 ai5 =0 a16 a26 a36 a46 ai6 =0
Canada 4.836 -46.17 -2.038 13.36 [0.000] -1.189 -0.224 -0.183 -0.087 [0.000]
(12.19) (10.63) (24.08) (11.55) (0.227) (0.203) (0.263) (0.277)
France -12.49 -7.351 23.99 27.90 [0.576] -0.092 0.714 0.662 0.089 [0.074]
(21.79) (13.15) (31.99) (25.18) (0.377) (0.320) (0.437) (0.287)
Germany 1.760 31.66 18.35 -7.115 [0.036] -0.699 -0.589 -1.512 0.416 [0.765]
(21.32) (12.79) (11.49) (12.03) (2.379) (1.268) (1.238) (1.439)
Italy -10.60 3.464 -30.82 -1.420 [0.085] -0.175 -0.144 -0.114 0.663 [0.793]
(16.92) (12.82) (11.37) (20.11) (0.720) (0.561) (0.506) (0.575)
Japan -29.60 3.764 41.88 -23.25 [0.000] -1.404 -0.132 -1.978 -0.009 [0.032]
(12.32) (5.77) (18.33) (11.58) (0.760) (0.509) (0.851) (0.864)
United Kingdom 218.8 -42.88 56.56 53.17 [0.000] 0.237 -0.233 0.483 0.581 [0.009]
(37.71) (59.35) (43.24) (47.58) (0.336) (0.303) (0.266) (0.253)
United States 57.65 9.873 57.80 -14.11 [0.679] -0.571 -0.529 -0.634 -0.595 [0.213]
(118.69) (101.15) (66.43) (61.84) (0.705) (0.535) (0.667) (0.425)
Note: Entries are the estimates (standard errors) of the parameters of system (3) capturing the contemporaneous eﬀects of
monetary-policy shocks on non-monetary variables. Numbers in brackets are the p-values associated with the χ2(4) test statistics
that ai5 =(a15 a25 a35 a45 )
0 = 0 and ai6 =(a16 a26 a36 a46 )
0 =0 .
33Table 4. Estimates of the Feedback Eﬀects
Countries a51 a52 a53 a54 a5j =0
Canada -12.99 210.9 -2.807 5.712 [0.008]
(29.83) (63.25) (15.29) (29.30)
France 2.730 -72.61 -1.007 -301.7 [0.524]
(7.681) (212.3) (2.268) (226.07)
Germany -4.285 -71.21 -4.128 92.08 [0.085]
(23.92) (199.7) (6.094) (201.5)
Italy 4.065 -161.40 12.69 -45.02 [0.008]
(11.55) (109.8) (3.956) (36.82)
Japan 36.83 6.016 -22.34 32.43 [0.000]
(30.79) (76.43) (4.524) (22.18)
United Kingdom 68.77 -129.6 1.603 80.79 [0.000]
(29.29) (133.7) (7.983) (28.11)
United States 4.088 31.71 -3.783 28.73 [0.726]
(32.89) (89.36) (6.773) (31.21)
Note: Entries for a5j (j =1 ,...,4) are the estimates (standard errors) of the parameters of system (3) related to the contempo-
raneous feedbacks of the monetary authority to non-monetary variables. Numbers in brackets are the p-values associated with
the χ2(4) test statistics that a5j =(a51 a52 a53 a54 )
0 =0 .





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: The solid (dotted) lines correspond to the unrestricted (restricted) monetary-policy shocks. The restrictions are those asso-
ciated with the M Indicator, R Indicator, No-Impact Eﬀects, and No-Feedback Eﬀects. The shaded boxes represent contractionary
phases (i.e. peaks to troughs) reported by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) for the United States and by the
Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI) (www.businesscycle.com) for the other countries. The ECRI applies the same method
than the one used by the NBER.







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: The solid lines correspond to the unrestricted responses of the various variables following monetary-policy shocks. The
dotted lines represent the error bands associated with the 68% probability intervals.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: The solid (dotted) lines correspond to the unrestricted (restricted) responses of real wages following monetary-policy shocks.
The restrictions are those associated with the M Indicator, R Indicator, No-Impact Eﬀects, and No-Feedback Eﬀects.
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